University of Kansas, Fall 2002
Philosophy 672: History of Ethics
Ben Eggleston

Class notes: Hume

The following notes correspond roughly to what we cover, including at least a portion of what I put on the board or the screen, in class. In places they may be more or less comprehensive than what we actually cover in class, and should not be taken as a substitute for your own observations and records of what goes on in class.

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  1. editor’s introduction, sections 1–3
    1. section 1: biography
      1. Hume was born in 1711 in Edinburgh, and published his A Treatise of Human Nature in 1739 and 1740.
      2. It, in his words, “fell dead-born from the Press,” and he resolved to rewrite it in parts. In 1751 he published his second Enquiry, which he later called “incomparably the best” of all his writings.
    2. section 2: Hume’s general philosophy
      1. empiricism
        1. All knowledge comes from experience.
        2. Theses should not be accepted unless they can be confirmed by experience.
      2. goals in moral philosophy
        1. Hume sought to discover the laws or principles that govern our attributions of virtue and vice: Why do we praise some people, and criticize others? This was part of his larger project of developing a “science of human nature” that would do for the mental world what Newtonian physics had done done for the physical world.
        2. He was constrained, in the development of this science, by the tenets of empiricism. So he required all his “data” for this new “science” to come from observation and experience (whether external, as with most science, or introspective).
      3. skepticism about (rationalist) morality
        1. Moral judgments are neither correct nor incorrect (in the usual senses of these terms).
        2. Moral values (virtue, justice, etc.) do not exist independently of minds that attribute them to things.
    3. section 3: background issues in moral philosophy
      1. reason vs. moral sense as the foundation of morality
      2. three rivals of moral-sense theories
        1. natural-law theory
          1. similar to Hume in virtue of basing moral philosophy on a study of human nature
          2. different in virtue of regarding human nature as normative (i.e., in proceeding prescriptively rather than descriptively)
        2. rationalism
        3. egoism
  2. section 1: “Of the General Principles of Morals”
    1. 1.3: motivating question—whether moral judgments are based on reason or sentiment
      1. one aspect of this question’s significance: whether the powers of reason extend into this domain
      2. another aspect of this question’s importance: whether bad people could be condemned as irrational, as well as (just) vicious. (Philosophers, perhaps more than most people, regard the epithet ‘irrational’ as particularly damning!)
    2. 1.5: considerations in favor of rationalism about morality
      • We reason about moral matters, just as we do about non-moral matters.
    3. 1.6–8: considerations in favor of moral-sense theories
      1. 1.6: Morality seems closely akin to emotion.
      2. 1.7–8: Moral judgments inherently motivate, but the “understanding” (the faculty of reason) never discovers anything inherently motivating, so moral judgments must not be products of the understanding.
    4. 1.9: use of both reason and sentiment in making moral judgments
    5. 1.10–11: plan of the essay
      1. 1.10: to discover the true “origin of morals” (and if this can be done, then we’ll resolve the reason vs. sentiment debate as a result)
      2. 1.10: to do so by examining virtues and the vices and seeing what they all have in common
      3. 1.10: to do this only via the “experimental” method (i.e., relying only on observation and experience)
      4. 1.11: start with benevolence and justice
  3. appendix 1: “Concerning Moral Sentiment”
    1. A1.1: revisiting the question of whether moral judgments are based on reason or sentiment
    2. implications of the “foregoing hypothesis”
      1. A1.2: role of reason in many cases of moral judgment
      2. A1.3: indispensability of sentiment in moral judgment
      3. So the “foregoing hypothesis” implies defeat for the rationalist.
    3. A1.4: But suppose the foregoing to be false. Then the rationalist position can still be attacked in five ways.
      1. A1.5–10: inability of the rationalist account to explain why things we regard as vices are bad
        1. Hume's argument (apparently):
          1. Every judgment of reason is either a judgment of a matter of fact or a judgment of relations. (A1.6)
            1. A judgment of ingratitude is not a judgment of a matter of fact. (A1.6)
            2. A judgment of ingratitude is not a judgment of relations. (A1.7–9)
              1. not a relation of contrariety (A1.7)
              2. not a relation like that of arithmetic equality (A1.8)
              3. not the relation of actions to the rule of right—circularity (A1.9)
          2. This is not specious metaphysics; rather, it stems entirely from observation of the way people make moral judgments.
        2. some concerns (addressed more fully in the Treatise, but sadly neglected here):
          1. other possible operations of reason than just these two?
          2. other relations than the ones Hume considers?
      2. A1.11–12: separation of fact-finding from judgment-rendering
        1. Hume’s claims in A1.11
          1. no moral judgment without all (relevant) facts in hand first
          2. nothing for the understanding to do once all the facts are in hand
        2. some concerns
          1. a coherent story, but premises not clearly identified
          2. begging the question against the rationalist?
        3. Hume’s comments on Nero: quite typical of sentimentalism
      3. A1.13–16: analogy between moral beauty and natural beauty
        1. Hume’s claims
          1. how natural beauty is ascertained (A1.13–15)
          2. how moral beauty is ascertained (A1.16)
        2. some concerns
          1. again: begging the question against the rationalist?
          2. “position of its beauty” (A1.15); is strength then not a factual matter?
      4. A1.17: inanimate objects
      5. A1.18–20: ultimate ends
        1. Hume’s claims
          1. existence of some ends sought without reference to further ends
          2. impossibility of reason to determine such ultimate ends
        2. some concerns
          1. rationality of some ultimate ends, irrationality of others?
          2. rationality of virtue as an end?
    4. A1.21: conclusion
      1. “The other has a productive faculty . . .”
      2. “The standard of the other, arising from the internal frame . . .”
  4. section 2: “Of Benevolence”
    1. part 1 (2.1–5)
      1. Hume’s task: to show that benevolence is a virtue
      2. the evidence: that people praise it highly
      3. 2.5: “it will suffice to remark . . .” (connection with virtue)
    2. part 2 (2.6–23)
      1. Hume’s task: to figure out what makes benevolence a virtue
      2. the point: to figure out what makes each of the virtues a virtue
      3. the answer (in regard to benevolence): that it is useful (2.8)
      4. the evidence
        1. that pointing out something’s utility is how we praise it, and get others to appreciate it; and the reverse with disutility (2.9–16)
        2. that our moral judgments track our perceptions of things’ utility and disutility
          1. “If any false opinion . . . we retract our first sentiment . . .” (2.17)
          2. examples: 2.18–21
      5. still to be done
        1. ascertain “How considerable a part” of the social virtues’ merit is due to their utility
        2. ascertain why anything’s utility commends it to us as a (possible) virtue
  5. appendix 2: “Of Self-Love”
    1. Hume’s aim: to rebut theses of psychological egoism
      1. A2.1: one kind of psychological egoism: Everyone always consciously seeks his or her own interests, above all else.
      2. A2.2: another kind: Everyone always, consciously or not, seeks his or her own interests, above all else.
    2. Hume’s arguments
      1. the practical irrelevance of the second thesis
        1. A2.4, middle: varieties of self-love
        2. A2.4, end: dismissal of “philosophy”
      2. ordinary observation (A2.6, beginning)
      3. examples of benevolence (A2.7, end, through A2.11)
      4. simplicity
        1. against simplicity in one sense, for it in another (A2.7)
        2. multiple primary motives, but self-love necessarily secondary (A2.12–13)
  6. section 3: “Of Justice”
    1. part I (3.1–21)
      1. Hume’s aim: to show that justice is a virtue solely because of its utility (3.1)
        1. assuming that justice is a virtue (contrast with benevolence)
        2. assuming that utility is part of its virtuousness
        3. not claiming that we ought to promote utility (as a utilitarian would claim)
      2. what justice is and concerns
        1. a “jealous virtue” (3.3)
        2. interactions among “equals” (3.18)
        3. not harming others (3.10)
        4. respecting others’ property (3.3)
        5. keeping promises and related obligations (3.6)
      3. the circumstances of justice (3.2–11)
        1. limitations that make justice necessary
          1. on natural resources (vs. 3.2–5)
          2. on “social resources” (generosity, etc.) (vs. 3.6–7)
        2. bare minima that make justice possible
          1. of natural resources (vs. 3.8)
          2. of “social resources” (vs. 3.9–11)
      4. the argument
        1. When justice is a virtue, it is useful. (3.12–21)
        2. The best explanation of this correlation is that when justice is a virtue, this is solely because of its usefulness.
        3. Therefore, justice is a virtue only because of its usefulness.
    2. part II (3.22–48)
      1. Hume’s aim: to show that the content of justice is consistent with the hypothesis that the point of justice is its utility (3.22)
      2. some conceptions of justice
        1. property according to virtue (benevolence, etc.)—nice, but impractical (3.23)
        2. equality of property—more practical, but extremely pernicious (3.24–26)
        3. the actually practiced conception (3.28)—very useful
      3. indispensability of appeals to utility in defending rules (3.29–30)
      4. the structure of justice
        1. “natural” justice (3.34)
        2. specification in civil law
          1. based on particular circumstances of society (3.31–35)
          2. not arbitrary as religious custom (“superstition”) is (3.36–38)
          3. example: rules of promising (3.38, n. 13)
      5. the acquiredness (instead of innateness) of the sentiment (in favor) of justice (3.39–45)
        1. plausibility of its acquiredness (3.39)
        2. implausibility of its innateness (3.40–43, 3.46)
          1. would have been noticed (3.40)
          2. complexity of justice (3.41–42, 3.46)
        3. analogy with house-building (3.44–45)
        4. its urgency a sign of its importance (3.47)
      6. conclusion (3.48)
        1. established that justice is a virtue only because of its usefulness
        2. infer that utility is the basis for many other virtues as well
  7. appendix 3: “Some Farther Considerations with Regard to Justice”
    1. Hume’s aims
      1. to distinguish the natural virtues from the artificial ones (A3.1)
      2. to say how justice is, and is not, conventional, natural, and arbitrary
    2. natural vs. artificial (A3.2–6)
      1. natural virtues
        1. typically useful in each individual case (A3.2)
        2. do not require “concurrence” of others in a larger system (A3.2)
        3. like a wall (A3.5)
      2. artificial virtues
        1. produce benefits from participation of many in a system (A3.3)
        2. often have bad consequences in individual cases (A3.3–4)
        3. like a vault (A3.5)
    3. how justice is not, and is, conventional (A3.7–8)
    4. how justice is, and is not, natural (A3.9)
    5. how justice is, and is not, arbitrary (A3.10 and n. 65)
  8. section 4: “Of Political Society”
    1. Hume’s aims
      1. to show that political allegiance (or obedience) is a virtue solely because of its utility (4.1)
      2. to show that other traits or practices are virtuous in proportion to their utility
    2. initial examples
      1. rules of justice vs. international law (4.2–4)
      2. chastity/faithfulness (4.5–6)
    3. apparent counter-examples and their explanation (4.7)
      1. apparent counter-examples
        1. extension of the chastity/faithfulness rule past child-bearing age
        2. lack of virtue of the useful man (hunchback’s “desk”)
      2. explanation: associations of ideas
    4. other examples
      1. incest (4.8–9)
      2. privacy, etc. (4.10–12)
        1. keeping confidences (4.10)
        2. telling stories without attribution (4.11)
        3. respecting others’ privacy (4.12)
      3. manners and social customs
        1. good manners (4.13)
        2. friends and casual acquaintances (4.14)
        3. “drinking companion[s]” (4.16)
        4. using roads (4.19)
      4. justice even among the unjust
        1. honor among thieves (4.15)
        2. “courtly love” (4.17)
        3. war and fighting (4.20)
      5. recreational activities (4.18)
  9. section 5: “Why Utility Pleases”
    1. part 1 (5.1–15)
      1. Hume’s aims
        1. in this section: to show why utility pleases, or to show how the fact that useful things meet with our approval follows from “principles, the most known and avowed in human nature” (5.2)
        2. in this part: to argue that utility does not please solely on the basis of self-interest
      2. Hume’s argument
        1. a preliminary point
          1. Some virtues are natural—not all invented by politicians, etc. (5.4–5)
          2. What they have in common is that they promote utility. Therefore, utility must please us, “either from considerations of self-interest, or from more generous motives and regards.” (5.5)
        2. the main point: self-interest alone is not a sufficient explanation for our valuing of useful character traits. (5.6–14)
          1. recognition of virtue in people we have no connection with
          2. recognition of virtue in people whose virtue harms us
    2. part 2 (5.16–47)
      1. Hume’s aim
        1. to show (by two different arguments) that we are directly concerned with the well-being of others
        2. to show how appearances are corrected by judgment
      2. the “a priori” argument (5.43; see also 5.17 and 5.46)—not really a priori, alas
        1. We favor what is useful to society.
        2. We would not favor what is useful for society if we were not directly concerned with the well-being of others.
        3. Therefore, we are directly concerned with the well-being of others.
      3. the “a posteriori” argument (5.44)
        1. We ascribe merit to the social virtues in various observable ways.
        2. The best explanation of this is that we are sympathetically interested in others.
        3. This is a kind of direct concern with the well-being of others.
        4. Therefore, we are directly concerned with the well-being of others.
      4. the operations of sympathy (5.18–40)
        1. in household affairs (5.19–21)
        2. in theater and poetry (5.24–30)
        3. in accounts of history (5.32–34)
        4. the (near-)universality of sympathy (5.39–40)
      5. how judgment corrects appearances (5.41–42)
        1. perception of physical objects
        2. “tree known by the fruit”
  10. section 6: “Of Qualities Useful to Ourselves”
    1. part 1 (6.1–22)
      1. Hume’s aims
        1. to show that considerations of utility underlie our judgments of “private or selfish virtues” as well as our judgments of the “public and social” ones (6.20)
        2. to show that these judgments are not essentially egoistic
      2. our approval of useful character traits (6.7–20)
      3. not essentially egoistic: 6.3, 6.22
      4. passages to consider
        1. 6.5: making a choice between what is useful and what is pernicious the same as making a moral distinction
        2. 6.15: passion and reason
        3. 6.16: impiety and injustice vs. stupidity
    2. part 2 (6.23–35)
      1. Hume’s aims
        1. to extend his theory to “bodily endowments” and “goods of fortune” (6.23)
        2. again, to show that these judgments are not essentially egoistic
      2. “bodily endowments” (6.24–28)
        1. how “bodily endowments” are a test case for his theory
        2. assumption: bodily endowments are essentially like the virtues already considered
        3. 6.27
      3. “goods of fortune” (6.29–35)
        1. again, not essentially egoistic—example: prisoner of war (6.31)
        2. 6.35
  11. section 7: “Of Qualities Immediately Agreeable to Ourselves”
    1. showing that some virtues are judged so because they are “agreeable” (not instrumentally useful) to their possessors
    2. examples: cheerfulness, a sense of dignity, courage, tranquility, benevolence, delicacy of taste
    3. evidence that agreeableness differs from utility (7.22)
    4. role of sympathy in these being judged virtues (7.29)
    5. how sympathy gives unity to the whole system (7.29)
  12. section 8: “Of Qualities Immediately Agreeable to Others”
    1. showing that some virtues are judged so because they are “agreeable” (not instrumentally useful) to others
    2. examples: politeness, wit, eloquence, cleanliness
      1. modesty (outward; vs. inward pride) (8.8–10)
      2. vanity (8.11)
    3. “faults are nothing but smaller vices” (8.13)
    4. manner . . . different from external beauty” (8.14)
    5. not essentially egoistic (8.15)
  13. section 9: “Conclusion”
    1. part 1 (9.1–13)
      1. review of the 2-by-2 catalogue of the virtues (9.1–3)
        1. found in common opinion
        2. rejection of the “monkish virtues” (9.3)
      2. morality and the “common point of view” (9.4–11)
        1. “two requisite circumstances . . .” (9.5)
        2. “One man’s ambition . . .” (9.6)
        3. moral sentiments inflamed, selfish ones dampened (9.9)
      3. distinguishing the catalogue from the virtues’ basis in “humanity and sympathy” (9.12–13)
    2. part 2 (9.14–25)
      1. Is in one’s interest to be virtuous?—a practical as well as theoretical question (9.14)
      2. the appeal of virtue (9.15)
      3. the desirability of the selfish and companionable virtues—easy to show (9.17–18)
      4. the desirability of the enlarged virtues
        1. similarity to the companionable virtues (9.19)
        2. as easily the basis of self-love as (e.g.) ambition or avarice—in every case “the indulgence of some affection” (9.20)
        3. obvious desirability of being virtuous, if one could choose (9.21)
        4. the sensible knave (9.22–25)
  14. appendix 4: “Of Some Verbal Disputes”
    1. Hume’s aim: to address the concern that some of what he has treated as virtues are really just talents, and that some of what he has treated as vices are just defects
    2. first point (A4.2): The usual proposed ways of drawing this distinction do not work.
    3. second point (A4.3–10): The same sorts of reactions (first-person and third-person) are elicited by all.
    4. third point (A4.11–20): Ancient writers did not refuse to regard talents and defects as virtues and vices.
    5. fourth point (A4.21–22): The reason why some people think defects are not vices is that they see morality in religious terms, and associate it with punishment, which they see as inappropriate in the case of things that are not under the control of the person in question. But this is a distinction imposed on the virtues, not one found in them as objects of study.
  15. “A Dialogue”
    1. par. 2–16: Palamedes’s sketch of a supposedly very objectionable people
    2. par. 17: Palamedes’s claim of conflict between Athenian and modern standards of morality
    3. par. 18: Hume’s claim that morality is the one area in which the ancients were as advanced as the moderns
    4. par. 19–24: Hume’s sketch of a people as objectionable as the Athenians (important to see Hume’s aim here)
    5. par. 25: Palamedes’s relativistic claim (incompatible with Hume’s assertion of system)
    6. par. 26–36: Hume’s reply: that customs were believed conducive to morals (esp. par. 26 and 36)
    7. par. 37–51: Hume’s account of how circumstances may shape morals
      1. military vs. pacific (par. 39)
      2. compromise between the useful and the agreeable (par. 47–48; cf. par. 32)
    8. par. 52–57: difficulty of explaining “artificial” lives